PRISON REFORM – REBUILDING CORRECTIONS
The California Coalition on Corrections

Summary

We are a group of retired law enforcement and correctional executives, managers, and staff specialists who have examined the correctional system during the past year. The California system[1] has devolved from being one of the best systems in the country to a sub-par, dysfunctional system that trails all other large states. Our review showed, as other studies have revealed, numerous correctional system problems and issues that should be addressed to rebuild that which is today a fragmented, overly expensive correctional system.

One issue stands out as the major correctional system problem:

·        The lack of a correctional agency responsible for systemwide independent planning and monitoring has been a crippling impediment to dealing with system deficiencies.

Without central planning for the total correctional system, significant policy decisions are made on an ad hoc basis to satisfy individual state or county correctional needs. None of the individual county and state correctional agencies has the responsibility, authority, or capacity to lead or coordinate the total system. There is no source of independent, unbiased policy advice that the governor and legislature can rely on for objective advice on how to deal with the statewide correctional system.

The absence of a strategic planning and monitoring process is a major cause of correctional system problems. The California corrections system, a $10 billion per year system, lacks direction. For instance, the state is investing many billions for additional prison beds without consideration of the source of prison overcrowding, the shortage of county jail beds.

We respectfully offer the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1:

The state should create a permanent, independent correctional system planning and coordinating agency responsible for strategic correctional system planning. This planning agency would become the major source of correctional system information for state and local government. The Correctional Standards Agency (CSA),[2] if made an independent agency with the added responsibility for strategic system planning and coordination, could fulfill this role.

Recommendation 2:

Correctional beds have a life span of 30 years or longer. Prior to any construction of additional prison or jail beds, the state must conduct an analysis of the correctional system, beginning with population and crime estimates for future years and starting system analysis at the front end, the point of arrest, and proceeding “downstream” to probation, county jails, and the prison system. It should be noted that an analysis means an analysis of readily available data and not another study of the correctional system.

Correctional system data is readily available, both in the form of routine system data maintained by the Department of Justice and the Correctional Standards authority and in studies of various parts of the system by blue ribbon and professional groups. Such an analysis requires days or a couple weeks at most. There is no legitimate reason for such an analysis not being conducted and published.

The analysis has to deal with all significant correctional system issues including, above all, the huge shortage of county jail beds noted in a recent study by the California State Sheriffs’ Association, which states: “California is short 66,385 jail beds statewide right now to meet current public safety demands.”[3] In 2005, 233,388 individuals avoided incarceration or were released early from jail sentences due solely to lack of jail space. That study did not deal with the major issue of the shift of short-term offenders to prison, where they now occupy about 38,000 prison beds and cause prison overcrowding.

Consideration must be given to the facts that prison overcrowding would not be an issue if adequate county jail capacity were available, and that county jail operating costs are usually lower than state prison operating costs. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DC&R) consistently reports that institutions and camps operate at about 200% of design capacity. Design capacity is a California definition based on one inmate for each cell and does not reflect American Correctional Association (ACA) national standards requiring single cells “for inmates assigned to maximum custody.” DC&R should indicate the number of inmates housed in facilities not in compliance with ACA standards, particularly the number of inmates housed in gyms, libraries, etc., and how many maximum security inmates are housed two per cell.

Recommendation 3:

For the short term, the DC&R needs to implement strategies to manage the size of the prison population to match prison capacity. The common and usual strategy of most correctional systems is to cut length of stay (LOS) by a few days to bring capacity into line with demand. Managing length of stay is a commonly used strategy for dealing with overcrowding primarily because there is no relationship between LOS and offender behavior after release.[4] County jails release about 20,000 inmates early per month to match capacity with population. This strategy has been utilized by previous administrations.

Additional bed capacity can be created by reducing the current average 587-day prison LOS, a strategy used by many correctional systems (including California in the past). Reducing LOS from 587 to 543 days would reduce bed space needs by 15,000 beds and save $450,000,000 annually in prison operating costs.[5] Reductions in LOS can be achieved by several strategies, ranging from adjustments in the good time credits program to employment release programs.

Recommendation 4:

The state should fund probation services to assure effective supervision of offenders at the local level and reduce reliance on the state prison system due to inadequate probation services.

Currently, the supervision and surveillance of probationers and county jail parolees are at a severely reduced level. California and Indiana are the only states that do not fund probation services and depend on counties for financing.[6] Regular probation is a cost-effective alternative to a sentence of probation with a jail sentence. A sentence of probation and a jail commitment of up to a year is a cost-effective alternative to commitment to prison.

Recommendation 5:

The state should fix the parole system, particularly the revocation system. Failing to fix the revocation system costs one-quarter to a half billion dollars annually in added prison operating costs.

For several years the DC&R operated two programs/strategies. If reinstituted, one could reduce prison bed space demands and the other could provide reasonable alternatives to returning parolees with minor parole violations to prison.

A.     Substantial bed saving can be achieved by reinstituting a parolee employment program operated successfully in the 1960s and 1970s.[7] The parolee employment program allowed for release on parole at any time during the last 120 days of the term of selected inmates, providing they had a legitimate employment offer and residential program. In addition to ensuring that most parolees being released to the community have residence and legal employment, substantial cost savings would result.

B.     Another strategy is to provide substantial funding to increase contracts with public, nonprofit and for-profit agencies and groups for a variety of residential and community services and programs. These contracts would provide cost-effective alternatives to return to prison for a revocation term. The state currently has the authority under the Penal Code to contract with local agencies and organizations for work furlough facilities[8] and community corrections centers.[9] A few of these are currently in operation. More locally operated facilities are needed both to deal with overcrowding and to assist in the transition of offenders back to their communities.

Savings in the institutional budget from the above-noted parolee employment program could be used to fund community program contracts. The DC&R has used the strategy of funding parole programs from savings in institutional costs resulting from bed savings. In order for this strategy to work, there must be contracts for sufficient community residential capacity. If pursued appropriately, such a strategy could save substantial funds because brief stays in a contract facility would be less costly than a revocation term served in prison.

C.    In order to fix the parole revocation system permanently, the state should establish a community corrections program with features similar to successful community corrections programs operated by Minnesota and Oregon since the early 1970s.

Under a community corrections act, counties contract with the state to provide parole supervision. Parole violations would be handled in the same manner a violations by felony probationers by the courts. It is very probable that parole violation rates would return to normal/expected levels under the counties.

The state successfully contracted out parole supervision to a few small rural counties in the 1970s to reduce the cost of parole supervision for a few parolees living in areas remote from a parole unit office. The community corrections program could be piloted with a couple small and midsize counties and, if successful, gradually phased in with other counties willing to participate.

Recommendation 6:

Direct the Division of Adult Parole Operations to monitor and comply with Penal Code section 3001 requiring the discharge of certain parolees from parole supervision at the end of one, two, or three years unless ordered retained on parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for good cause. Good cause should be based on arrests or a documented behavioral pattern showing the parolee continues to present a danger to the community.

The BPH should revise Title 15 Section 2535 Discharge Review to define good cause to retain an offender on parole on the basis of arrests or a documented behavioral pattern showing parolee continues to present a danger to the community.

Penal Code section 3001 mandates discharging most parolees at the end of their minimum term of supervision unless otherwise ordered retained by the Board of Prison Terms for good cause. Retaining offenders on parole who no longer require supervision reduces resources for the supervision of higher risk offenders. The Division of Adult Parole Operations appears not to comply fully with Penal Code section 3001. As a result, California discharges offenders from parole at about half the national rate (20% versus the national average of 40%) and at a far lower rate than other large states which discharge about 55% of their parole population. This is a management issue and requires routine monitoring and quality control by management and unit supervisors.

Go to www.rebuildcorrections.lincal.com for the full report.

The California Coalition on Corrections

Edward Veit, Chair; Deputy Director, Retired, DC&R; Former Executive Officer, Board of Corrections

Richard McKone, Executive Officer; Parole Agent III, Retired, DC&R; Former Criminal Justice Planner, California Council on Criminal Justice & California Youth Authority

Robert Bowman, Regional Parole Administrator, retired, DC&R

Ronald Chun, Regional Parole Administrator, retired, DC&R

Robert Dickover, Administrator, Research & Evaluation Unit, retired, DC&R

Jerry Dimaggio, Regional Parole Administrator, retired, DC&R

Robert Doran, Deputy Director, retired, DC&R

Robert E. Keldgord, Chief, retired, Sacramento County Probation Department; former Program Director, California State Board of Corrections; former California Director, National Council on Crime & Delinquency

Mike Marculescu, Detective, Sunnyvale Public Safety Department, retired; Investigator, Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office

Joseph Phelan, California Youth Authority Administrator, retired; former Director, National Institute of Corrections; former Director of Training, National Institute of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention; former Juvenile Justice Planner, Office of Criminal Justice Planning

REBUILDING CORRECTIONS
The California Coalition on Corrections
02/27/2007

Dedication

This report is respectfully dedicated to the late Richard A. McGee, the first Director of the California Department of Corrections (1944–1961) and Youth and Adult Corrections Agency administrator from 1961 to 1967.

It was his distinguished leadership, vision, foresight, and integrity which made California a national leader in the field of corrections in the 1940s, ’50s, ’60s, and early ’70s.

He started his correctional career in Minnesota, followed by assignments in the State of Washington, and in 1944 he was selected by Governor Earl Warren to reorganize and improve California’s then mediocre correctional programs. He served with unparalleled distinction until his retirement in 1967, and served four California governors.

At the time of his retirement in late 1967, he was widely recognized for the unique contributions which this extraordinarily talented gentleman had made—not just to California corrections, but to the field of corrections nationally. California was, indeed, fortunate to have had the services of so distinguished a leader in corrections for so many years.

MISSION STATEMENTS:

1.      To increase correctional system effectiveness and reduce costs

2.      To support the re-configuration of a California correctional system for the 21st century

3.      To encourage the development of a 21st century California system

4.      To support the establishment of a rational correctional planning process and provide means and opportunities for assessing new correctional opportunities

5.      To provide independent correctional system information

INTRODUCTION

The California correctional system has devolved from being one of the best systems in the country to a sub par, dysfunctional system that trails all other large states. Various aspects of the correctional system, particularly the prison system, have been examined by several blue ribbon commissions and other very competent groups,[10] but most of their recommendations for improvement have not been adopted. The findings of these groups are not in question.

We are a group of retired state, county, and private correctional agency and department managers and executives[11] who believe the statewide correctional system[12] is in urgent need of repair. We believe our knowledge and familiarity with the system enables us to present a different perspective, namely the perspective of insiders and practitioners. Previous commissions and studies do not adequately address the total correctional system and its downstream impact on the jail and prison system.[13] We believe this is critical in order to deal with any part of the correctional system, including the prison system. We examined the statewide correctional system, which includes both local and state correctional facilities and programs, and we respectfully offer the following recommendations.

We do not, in any way, intend to be critical of the thousands of dedicated, hardworking individuals who labor in the vineyards of California corrections, at either the state or local levels. These folks are, in our judgment, to be commended for their efforts. The problem does not lie in the performance of California’s correctional professionals; the problem lies in the fact that we have a dysfunctional nonsystem.

This paper presents factual information about the state of the correctional system and recommendations for both long-range and immediate actions that can substantially improve the effectiveness and quality of California’s correctional system. These actions, if implemented, will help restore public confidence in our correctional agencies. As an independent coalition beholden to no person or organization, we have no reason to present anything other than an objective analysis of the system and realistic recommendations. We have no vested interest in the subject, aside from the common interest shared by all Californians—namely, that an effective correctional system benefits everyone.

The term “correctional system” as applied to current operations in California is used herein solely as a semantic convenience. In reality, California does not have a correctional system. Rather, it has a “nonsystem,” a point which was first underscored in a 1971 report by the California State Board of Corrections.[14]

The incredible size of the statewide correctional system and the nature of its operations would present a challenge to leaders and management even if it were operating at an ideal level.

The California correctional system, with 120-plus state and local agencies, is the largest in the country; it has over 800,000 individuals under correctional control, more than 70,000 full-time personnel, and an annual budget of about $10 billion. There are over 500,000 adult offenders under community supervision,[15] 250,000 adults in correctional facilities,[16] and an additional 83,000 juveniles in the correctional system.[17] There are also a significant number of public and private contract correctional facilities and programs.

The California incarceration rate is about average compared to other large states, although substantially higher than New York, as shown by table 1. Given that there is no systemwide strategic planning or coordination process, major system problems and deficiencies are predictable and expected.

Table 1. Incarceration Rates for Prisoners under Jurisdiction
by Comparable States 6/30/2005[18]

The correctional system flows downstream from the point of law enforcement contact to local custody, court decision, and sentencing to either state or local control in correctional programs or facilities. A correctional system flowchart shows numerous decision points, each of which has correctional program and cost consequences. Changing any part of the system requires analysis of its potential impact on other parts of the system. This is particularly important in dealing with physical facilities such as jails, camps, and prisons, where the program and cost implications are very high. Physical facilities, mainly county jails and prisons, are the dominant feature of any correctional system. Prisons and jails are very expensive to build and are even more expensive to operate; they consume about 80% of the correctional system operating budgets. For this basic reason, California should be very concerned with the apparent intent of the state to build more prison beds without conducting a normal systemwide planning process.

Although it might sound counterintuitive to anyone not familiar with the correctional system, a glance at available data clearly indicates that more jail beds, not prison beds, are needed to eliminate prison overcrowding. There may very well be a need for specialized prison beds (e.g., medical beds), but it is irrational to spend huge sums of money building more prisons when data clearly indicate that the substantial county jail bed shortage is the major reason for prison overcrowding.

Correctional services in California have deteriorated drastically and dramatically during the past 30 years.

Until the late 1970s, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), formerly the California Youth Authority, was recognized nationally, if not internationally, as one of the finest, most progressive and innovative juvenile corrections agencies in America. The DJJ had an outstanding research unit whose findings were widely quoted in various journals. It repeatedly and consistently received awards for its work with troubled youth. Today, the DJJ is frequently the subject of justifiable criticism by the press, by politicians, and by other organizations. There are calls to eliminate it as a youth correctional agency. In at least one instance, the agency was the subject of intense scrutiny by the federal courts and agreed to a consent decree regarding the operation of one of its facilities.

Until the late 1970s the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DC&R) also enjoyed a very enviable reputation. Along with the corrections agencies in Michigan, Wisconsin, and a few other jurisdictions, the DC&R was readily recognized as one of the nation’s best state-operated corrections departments. Today, the DC&R is readily criticized by the press, by politicians, by citizen groups, and by other organizations. Like the DJJ, now in the DC&R, it has also incurred close scrutiny by the federal courts, especially in the area of medical care for inmates.

Until the late 1970s, California’s county-operated probation departments were similarly recognized as having developed some of the most innovative and progressive probation programs in the nation. Several California counties, including Los Angeles and Sacramento, won national awards. Today, the supervision and surveillance of probationers is hardly extant. Most county-operated departments simply do not supervise most offenders assigned to them by the courts. Rather, the majorities of such cases are merely consigned to filing cabinets and are euphemistically referred to as “banked caseloads.”[19]

As of March 2006, the Chief Probation Officers of California reported that, statewide, only 48% of the probationers assigned are actually subject to supervision and surveillance.[20] The remaining 52%, many of whom are convicted felons, are consigned to the banked caseloads. In one large county, 12% to 14% of the cases are supervised.[21] To be sure, probation departments try to supervise those cases which portend the greatest public safety risk, but for the most part, the supervision of most probationers in California no longer exists. A 1996 article by Professor Joan Petersilia of the University of California–Irvine readily illustrates the situation.[22]

One might well speculate as to the reasons for the deterioration of state-operated correctional services in California. Some observers have suggested the infusion of partisan politics, because prior to the 1970s DC&R directors frequently remained in office for many years despite changes of power in the governor’s office. Other observers have suggested the increased influence of organized labor. With respect to probation, there can be no doubt as to the cause of the deterioration of services. Simply stated, it has been the lack of funds, due in part to Proposition 13 being passed by the voters in June 1978. There is, however, another especially damaging element. In many counties, probation departments were not viewed as politically important or of high priority and thus were not deserving of the same financial support as was bestowed on the sheriff and the district attorney. Several studies at the state and local levels have illustrated this phenomenon.[23]

Just as it is an irrefutable fact that corrections in California has deteriorated during the past 30 years, it is also an irrefutable fact that corrections costs to Californians have skyrocketed and that citizens are not getting the biggest bang for the buck. Expenditures for corrections range from a low of about 27% of criminal justice expenditures in California in FY 1982/83 to a high of 46% in FY 1994/95. Corrections currently consumes about 38% of total statewide criminal justice expenditures.

Why has the correctional system deteriorated to such an extent?

The lack of total system leadership is the biggest factor in the system’s deterioration. Lack of system leadership applies to the statewide correctional system and not to any of the 120-plus county and state correctional agencies that constitute that system. None of the individual agencies has the responsibility, authority, or capacity to lead or coordinate the total system. Of course there have been many changes during past decades that have affected the landscape of corrections, as all public services have been affected.

During the golden years of the correctional system (from the 1950s through the 1970s) there was no actual appointed leader as such; an outstanding and able Director of Corrections and corrections agency administrator, Richard A. McGee, was the de facto leader of the system. He was, as are all great managers and leaders, a consummate planner who was able to influence and guide the development of an outstanding correctional system. It was reported many times that when he made presentations to the legislature, he was held in such high esteem that his proposals were accepted without reservation. It is widely believed that he was responsible for the establishment of the Board of Corrections, with the intention for the board (now the Correctional Standards Authority) to operate as quasi-independent systemwide correctional planning and coordinating agency.

Additionally, the California Youth Authority, now the Division of Juvenile Justice in the DC&R, was closely involved in setting and enforcing standards for probation and in designing and managing subvention programs. The probation subvention program entailed the state’s funding of selected probation supervision cases, providing that the counties did not make inappropriate commitments to the state and juvenile facilities. The program succeeded in its purposes, but was attacked politically and was eventually terminated for a variety of reasons. The end of state funding for local probation programs was one of several reasons for the decline in probation services. Today, California is one of only two states in which probation services are funded, in whole or in part, by local government, except for occasional grants.[24]

An inadequate investment in local corrections for several years has resulted in a huge and inappropriate shift of offenders to prison. County jail bed space did not increase to meet the need. As reported by the California State Sheriffs’ Association in June 2006:

“In California’s local adult system, jail facilities are bursting at the seams. Twelve percent of our jails are more than 60 years old, and nearly half are 30 years old or older. Dangerous crowding is a daily fact of life in many of the state’s 460 jails. Simply put, California does not have enough local detention capacity or adequate program space to meet public safety demands.” [25]

An additional factor that contributed to the shift is the fact that while county jails were under court-ordered population caps, the state prison system—which must accept all commitments—was not. This shift and the resulting overcrowding of the state prison system probably would not have occurred if there had been an agency actually monitoring and coordinating the total system. Failure to establish such leadership has resulted in a flawed and very expensive correctional system that is not providing a full measure of public protection at a reasonable cost. Passage of California’s collective bargaining law resulted in significant changes to California corrections, at both the state and local level. At the state level, it is sometimes alleged that labor organizations have undue influence on management decisions.

What are the major California correctional system problems?

There are major structural problems that require solutions before program reforms can even be considered. In summary, the most significant problems are:

1.      The lack of a central, systemwide correctional agency responsible for independent planning and monitoring has, for many years, been a crippling impediment to dealing with system deficiencies. It is the most significant problem of the correctional system.

Without a central point of leadership for the total correctional system, significant policy decisions are made on an ad hoc basis rather than on the basis of rational planning. It should be clear that the lack of leadership applies to the statewide correctional system and not to any of the county and state correctional agencies that constitute that system. None of the individual agencies has the responsibility, authority, or capacity to lead or coordinate the total system.

There is no counterweight to state bureaucrats or independent sources of expert opinion that the governor, state legislature, and legislative analyst can rely upon to provide rational, unbiased advice on how to deal with the statewide correctional system. The lack of a strategic planning and monitoring process is probably a major cause of the serious and costly correctional system problems. The California corrections system is a $10 billion per year system lacking direction. Without any consideration of actual need, the state is poised to invest additional billions in additional prison beds to deal with overcrowding, without conducting a systemwide analysis.

Correctional beds have a life span of 30 years or longer. Prior to any construction of additional prison or jail beds, the state must conduct an analysis of the correctional system, beginning with population and crime estimates for future years and starting system analysis at the front end, the point of arrest, and proceeding “downstream” to probation, county jails, and the prison system. It should be noted that an analysis means an analysis of readily available data and not another study of the correctional system.

Correctional system data is readily available, both in the form of routine system data maintained by the Department of Justice and the Correctional Standards authority and in studies of various parts of the system by blue ribbon and professional groups. Such an analysis requires days or a couple weeks at most. There is no legitimate reason for such an analysis not being conducted and published.

Available data clearly indicate that the shortage of county jail beds is the major cause of prison overcrowding. The front end of the correctional system at the local level[26] directly impacts the size of the state prison system. Prior to any actions (particularly any construction) to improve the state prison system, analysis must start at the front end of the system, the point of arrest and the county jail system.[27] To quote from a Michigan Task Force on Jail and Prison Overcrowding: “There is a relationship between jail and prison overcrowding: the actions taken by one system ultimately affect the other; they are not mutually exclusive.”[28] Failure to monitor and respond to changes and problems at the local level is the direct cause of overcrowding in both state and county facilities.

As previously indicated, the California correctional “system” was described as an ineffective “non-system” as early as 1971 in a Board of Corrections study.[29] Almost 30 years later, the Little Hoover Commission 1998 report on Corrections noted that the problems of California correctional programs are the “product of an ad hoc correctional policy that has evolved over time—influenced more by high-profile and isolated crimes than by reason and analysis.” This circumstance continues to be the major problem with the statewide correctional system and will continue to dim chances of improving it.

2.      There is a huge shortage of county jail beds, resulting in a massive shift of short-term offenders to prison.

Adding the number of beds occupied by short-term offenders in prison to the county bed shortage reported in a recent county jail study reveals a statewide shortage of about 100,000 county jail beds.

According to a California State Sheriffs’ Association report on county jails:

“It would take an additional 4,953 beds to house all the inmates in today’s ADP. … During times of peak demand for jail space, the state is short at least 12,800 jail beds. In 2005, 233,388 individuals avoided incarceration or were released early from jail sentences due solely to lack of jail space. It would take 18,471 additional beds to eliminate these pre-trial and early releases. There are over 285,000 unserved felony warrants and over 2,391,000 unserved misdemeanor warrants in California annually. If only 10% of the felony warrants resulted in someone being incarcerated, another 28,522 beds would be needed to house these felons.” (bold emphasis added)[30]

The chronic shortage of county jail beds has resulted in the shift of short-term offenders to prison, where they now occupy about 30,000 to 40,000 prison beds. These data clearly illustrate the fact that the county jail bed shortage is a major cause of prison overcrowding. Short-term offenders constituted 75% of the inmates paroled from prison in 2005. Only 25% of the prison releases served more than 12 months. This latter group constitutes the serious offender population that prisons are designed and intended to hold for a year or longer. Most of the short-term offenders should serve their short terms in county jails, which are designed and intended to hold offenders serving terms of less than 12 months.

If a normal planning process were conducted, the actual number of additional jail beds required could easily be determined. According to the California State Sheriffs’ Association, “California is short 66,385 jail beds statewide right now to meet current public safety demands. Looking to the future, California’s inexorable population growth will require 40,943 new beds by 2050 to address population growth alone.”[31] Their cost estimate for needed jail beds is “nearly five billion dollars ($4,913,160,000) between now and 2050 to construct just the new jail space needed to stay abreast of California’s projected population growth.”

A strategic plan to fund and build sufficient jail beds could be developed and implemented during the next decade. Responsibility for short-term offenders could be gradually returned to the local level. The prison overcrowding problem would be eliminated. California would have a prison system with about 125,000 inmates and a jail system with about 125,000 inmates, returning the system to the reasonable 50%-50% prison-county jail split that existed from the 1960s to the mid-1980s.[32] Building more prison beds would just push the system further out of balance.

3.      There were almost 2.7 million unserved warrants (285,000 felony and 2,400,000 misdemeanor warrants) as of December 2005.

Although the law enforcement community is well aware of this issue, most Californians would be surprised by the number of unserved warrants. The incredible number of unserved warrants is further evidence of the extent of the serious county jail bed space shortage.[33] As noted in the 2001 Correctional Standards Authority jail survey: “If even a small percentage of the unserved felony warrants were served and a small percentage of those warrants resulted in someone being incarcerated, there would not be enough space to house those additional individuals. There are currently about a quarter of a million unserved felony warrants in California; this number has remained fairly constant since 1995.”

The acute county jail bed shortage already requires release of over 20,000 inmates monthly due to lack of bed space.[34] There are over 285,000 unserved felony warrants and over 2,391,000 unserved misdemeanor warrants in California annually. According to the California State Sheriffs’ Association’s June 2006 report, if only 10% of the felony warrants resulted in someone being incarcerated, another 28,522 beds would be needed to house these felons.

This problem was predictable, and was in fact predicted by the CSA in its annual “Jail Profile Survey Report of 2001,” which stated: “The (County Jail) ADP continued to increase to a record high of 80,000 inmates in the 2nd Quarter of 1998, with no significant increase in the number of beds. The result was overwhelming crowding problems, thousands of inmates being released early due to lack of space, and a large backlog of unserved felony warrants. Obviously, if this trend was to continue, more and more individuals who normally would be confined to jail would be released, undermining the criminal justice system and raising serious public-safety concerns.” This has happened!

The unserved warrant problem obviously raises very serious questions that should be addressed by agencies and groups such as the CSA, Peace Officers Standards & Training Commission (POST), the California State Sheriffs’ Association, the California Police Chiefs Association, and others who speak for law enforcement and corrections in California.

4.      Probation services are so underfunded that most offenders placed on probation are assigned to “banked” or unsupervised caseloads.

In California, probation has traditionally been responsible for supervision and control of the largest portion of the offender population in the community. There is an offender population of about 360,000 probationers (about 72% felony probation and 28% misdemeanor probation) compared to 150,000 parolees in the community. Regular probation is a cost-effective alternative to a sentence of probation with a jail sentence for the offenders who can be safely supervised in the community. A sentence to probation and a jail commitment of up to a year is a cost-effective alternative to commitment to prison.

County probation departments currently operate under a ratio of about 1 probation officer to every 120 probationers, with the bulk of the offenders unsupervised in banked caseloads. Diminished probation services and the lack of adequate county jail beds places judges in the unenviable position of sentencing many offenders (commonly referred to as “wobblers”[35]) either to probation, where the offender may well be unsupervised in a banked caseload, or to prison to serve a short term. Neither alternative is appropriate, the first leaving offenders who constitute a threat to the community without supervision, and the second leaving offenders in prison at a higher bed cost, wasting a great deal of money. Prison bed costs are estimated to be about 10% to 20% higher than county jail bed costs.

During the 1960s, probation received state funding via probation subsidies which first appeared nationally on an experimental basis in Saginaw, Michigan, in the late 1950s or very early 1960s. The results were considered to be so successful that similar programs developed in other states. California’s probation subsidy law was enacted in 1965 and signed into law by Gov. Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, a former district attorney and attorney general. While the legislation enjoyed widespread support from a variety of statewide organizations, hindsight suggests that sufficient care was not taken to address some local issues and state-local issues which would, in the course of the program, create substantial dissatisfaction at the local level. On the other hand, the law did succeed in reducing the real or potential populations of state-operated facilities.

One of the shortcomings is that the funds channeled to local probation departments were dependent upon a reduction in the number of persons committed to the state system; another shortcoming is that the reimbursement rate to counties was not increased to reflect inflation, so that by the mid 1970s local governments no longer supported the program and some local officials noted that, once again, the State of California had been untrustworthy in state-county financial relationships—a view which, even today, some local officials still support, noting that in several areas, including criminal justice, the state has not been a trustworthy financial partner. Essentially, it was this dissatisfaction at the local level which killed the program.[36]

Clearly, any state reimbursement to counties for the probation supervision of felons or the construction and operation of local jails should take great care to avoid the pitfalls of 1965-1977.

5.      About 90,000 short-term offenders who should be serving terms in county jails occupy about 38,000 state prison beds, creating an “overcrowding crisis.”

There appears to have been little or no notice given to the trend of committing many less serious offenders to the state prison system rather than county jail, thus overcrowding state institutions. As shown by table 2, about 90,000 short-term offenders who should be serving their terms in county jails now occupy about 30,000 to 40,000 state prison beds. Prison bed operating costs are an estimated 10% to 20% higher than county jail costs.

Table 2. Estimated Prison Beds Occupied
by CY 2005 Releases to Parole Serving Less Than One Year[37]
(Based on DC&R Data Analysis Unit report, March 2006)